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CASE COMMENTS
A.

ARBrIRATION

Richmond, Fredericksburg& Potomac Railroad Co. v.
Transportation Communication InternationalUnion
973 F.2d 276 (4th Cir. 1992)
The arbitral process serves as an important method of dispute resolution
in the area of labor relations.' The strong federal policy favoring arbitration
over litigation offers both labor and management a resolution to their
dispute with less delay and expense.2 However, the only way to accomplish
these advantages of arbitration is to accord some sense of finality to the
judgments of arbitrators.3 To achieve this finality, courts must use a very
4
limited scope of review in assessing an arbitrator's decision.
In Richmond, Fredericksburg& Potomac Railroad v. Transportation
Communications InternationalUnion,5 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit stressed the deference owed to an arbitrator's award
and the limited role of judicial review in labor arbitration cases. The Fourth
Circuit held that the parties had empowered the arbitrator to determine the
legal relationship between the plaintiff railroad and defendant union. The
only justification for the Fourth Circuit to question the arbitrator's interpretation of the law is if the decision was in manifest disregard of the law.
The Fourth Circuit found that the arbitrator's legal analysis was in good
faith, not in manifest disregard of the law, and upheld the decision. The
Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's setting aside of the award and
remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the arbitrator's award.
In April of 1990, the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad
(RF&P) made a unilateral severance offer to those clerical employees at its
Potomac Yard facility who would voluntarily retire. However, the Trans-

I. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37 (1987) (stating
that federal statutes reflect preference for private settlement of disputes without government
intervention) (citing Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1947));
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960) (noting
that arbitration is substitute for industrial strife).
2. See Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 578 (stating that arbitration acts as
substitute for industrial strife thus proving advantageous over litigation).
3. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596
(1960) (stating that federal policy favoring arbitration would be undermined if courts had final
word).
4. See infra note 542 (citing cases defining courts' limited scope of review over decisions
of arbitration panels).
5. 973 F.2d 276 (4th Cir. 1992).
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portation Communications International Union (TCU), which represented
the clerks, argued that the RF&P could not legally negotiate with the
individual clerks, but rather that the railroad must deal directly with the
TCU. The RF&P refused to bargain with the TCU but finally agreed to
submit the dispute to an expedited arbitration of the matter.
The submission of the parties posed the following question to the
arbitrator: Whether the RF&P can unilaterally separate employees without
an agreement with the TCU. After reviewing the briefs and conducting a
hearing, the arbitrator found that the RF&P had failed to establish a
contractual authority to deal directly with the employees. Additionally, the
course of dealing between the parties did not show any such established
practice. In finding for the TCU, the arbitrator also based the decision on
federal cases citing the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 6 which requires railroads
to bargain with unions over questions of lump-sum buy-outs.
The RF&P brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia in order to set aside the decision of the
arbitrator. On the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the district
court held that the arbitrator had exceeded the scope of the parties'
submission by basing the decision on the RLA. The district court also
suggested that the legal analysis of the arbitrator was faulty.
The RF&P contended, and the district court found, that the arbitrator
exceeded his authority by considering federal case law in the analysis of the
dispute. The RF&P argued that the parties' submission confined the arbitrator to interpreting the collective bargaining agreement between the two
parties. The Fourth Circuit explained that although the Supreme Court has
not prohibited an arbitrator's recourse to legal authority, the parties' submission defines the limits of the arbitrator's authority. Additionally, no
statute requires the arbitrator to remain willfully ignorant of the governing
statutes and case law. If the parties fail to limit the powers of the arbitrator
in the submission, it is presumed that the arbitrator is the final judge of
any questions that arise from the submitted issue.
In looking at the parties' submission, the Fourth Circuit determined
that the RF&P and the TCU had submitted a broad issue to the arbitrator
with no limits on his authority. Although the RF&P argued that the parties
understood the submission to limit the arbitrator's analysis to the collective
bargaining agreement, the court found this argument undermined by the
brief which the plaintiff submitted to the arbitration panel. In its brief, the
RF&P cited federal cases to establish that the individual contracts were
legal; therefore, it explicitly put before the arbitrator the issue of the legality
of the contracts. The court further refused to find any implied restrictions
on the arbitrator's authority in the submission. If these restrictions were
implicit, it would countervene the purpose of arbitration, avoiding the delay
and expense of litigation. The Fourth Circuit explained that to advance the
policy favoring arbitration, courts should give deference to the arbitrator's

6. 45 U.S.C. § 153(i), (q) (1988).
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interpretation of the scope of the issue as long as it can be rationally derived
from the parties' submission. In this case, the court found that the submission rationally included the determination of the railroad's contractual
power as well as its legal authority to negotiate individually with the clerks.
The district court also had held that the arbitrator's legal analysis was
flawed irretrievably. However, the Fourth Circuit noted that in reviewing
arbitration awards, a court's role is to enforce the bargained-for decision
of the arbitrator and not to evaluate the factual or legal findings. As long
as the arbitrator has made a good faith effort to apply the law as the
arbitrator perceives it, the reviewing court cannot overturn the decision
because of a misinterpretation of the law, faulty legal reasoning, or an
erroneous legal conclusion. The only exception to this standard is when the
arbitrator has acted in manifest disregard of the law. In order for this
standard of review to apply, the arbitrator must have understood and stated
the law correctly but then have proceeded to disregard the same in order
to impose the arbitrator's own notions of right and wrong.
Although the district court had found that the cases cited by the
arbitrator were distinguishable from the present case, the Fourth Circuit
explained that this finding did not rebut the presumptive deference given
to the arbitrator's legal analysis. The district court also had found that by
relying on the cases cited in the arbitrator's decision, the arbitrator had
manifestly disregarded the recent Supreme Court case Pittsburgh & Lake
Erie Railroad v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n.7 However, the Fourth
Circuit found that the Supreme Court decision was only marginally relevant
to the issue of the legality of the railroad's unilateral severance offer.
Additionally, the courts appear to be split regarding the proper application
of the Pittsburgh & Lake Erie decision.' The Fourth Circuit explained that
in reviewing an arbitrator's decision, it is not the duty of the court to
resolve such legal conflicts, but rather to ascertain a basis for the arbitrator's
legal belief. The Fourth Circuit determined in this case that the arbitrator
had not disregarded the law, but rather had relied correctly on what he
believed the law to be. Thus, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court
and remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the arbitrator's award.
Although the circuits are split as to the application of Pittsburgh &
Lake Erie, the issue in Richmond was the deferential nature of the judicial
review of an arbitration award. On that point, the courts are fairly uniform
in their approach: courts are to afford the utmost deference to the decision
of the arbitrators. 9 However, courts will not uphold an award in which the

7. 491 U.S. 490 (1989).
8. See Brotherhood of Ry. Carmen v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 894 F.2d 1463, 1466 (5th

Cir. 1990) (finding that unilateral severance offer may be inconsistent with previous holdings);
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 850 F.2d 368, 375 (8th Cir. 1988)
(holding that unilateral separation offer is consistent with RLA).
9. See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987)
(stating that courts have limited power to review arbitration award); Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc.
v. Local 776, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436, 1441 (3rd Cir. 1992) (same); El Dorado
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arbitration panel exceeded its authority' ° or manifestly disregarded the law."
The Fourth Circuit found that neither of these exceptions applied in Richmond and correctly upheld the arbitrator's decision.
Summer Rain v. Donning Co./Publishers, Inc.
964 F.2d 1455 (4th Cir. 1992)
Section 3 of the Arbitration Act 2 requires a court to stay a proceeding
until arbitration of "any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement
in writing." In determining when an issue is referable to arbitration, some
courts have relied on the intertwining doctrine. Under the intertwining
doctrine, a court may deny arbitration "when the arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims arise out of the same transaction and are sufficiently

intertwined factually and legally.

. . . ",'3

The court may then hear all

claims together in one trial. In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd 4 the
United States Supreme Court rejected the intertwining doctrine in part by

Technical Servs., Inc. v. Union Gen. De Trabajadores de Puerto Rico, 961 F.2d 317, 319-20 (1st
Cir. 1992) (noting that award must stand if arbitrator acted within authority); Chrysler Motors
Corp. v. International Union, Allied Indus. Workers of Am., 959 F.2d 685, 687 (7th Cir. 1992)
(noting extremely limited judicial review of award); Robinson v. Transworld Airlines, Inc., 947
F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1991) (same); Interstate Brands Corp., Butternut Bread Div. v. Chauffeurs,
Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers Local Union No. 135, 909 F.2d 885, 888 (6th Cir. 1990)
(same); Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 920
F.2d 40, 45 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting extremely deferential nature of judicial review); NCR
Corp., E & M-Wichita v. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Dist. Lodge
No. 70, 906 F.2d 1499, 1503 (10th Cir. 1990) (same); Booth v. Hume Publishing Inc., 902 F.2d
925, 932 (l1th Cir. 1990) (stating judicial review of arbitration is narrowly limited); Delta Queen
Steamboat Co. v. District 2 Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 889 F.2d 599, 602 (5th Cir. 1989)
(noting that review is extremely limited).
10. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597
(1960) (stating that arbitrator does not sit to dispense his own brand of justice); Air Line Pilots
Ass'n Int'l v. Aviation Assocs. Inc., 955 F.2d 90, 93 (1st Cir. 1992) (noting that even if award
is reasonable it cannot be upheld if arbitrator exceeded authority); Delta Queen Steamboat Co.
v. District 2 Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Assoc., 889 F.2d 599, 602 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that
judicial deference ends when arbitrator exceeds limitations of contractual mandate of parties).
11. See, e.g., Upshur Coals Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am. Dist. 31, 933 F.2d
225, 229 (4th Cir. 1991) (stating that legal interpretation only overturned where it is in manifest
disregard of law); News Am. Publications, Inc. Daily Racing Form Div. v. Newark Typographical
Union, Local 103, 918 F.2d 21, 24 (3rd Cir. 1990) (stating that only if award is in manifest
disregard of agreement, unsupported by principles of contract construction and law of shop,
then award cannot stand) (quoting Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1126
(3rd Cir. 1969)); NCR Corp., E & M-Wichita v. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, Dist. Lodge No. 70, 906 F.2d 1499, 1504 (10th Cir. 1990) (same); Chicago Newspaper
Publishers' Ass'n v. Chicago Web Printing Pressmen's Union No. 7, 821 F.2d 390, 394 (7th Cir.
1987) (same); American Postal Workers Union, v. U.S. Postal Serv., 789 F.2d 1, 7 n.20 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (stating that award cannot be vacated based on mere errors of law).
12. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988).
13. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 216-17 (1985).
14. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
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holding that, even when the result is separate proceedings, a federal district
court must compel arbitration of pendent state claims when one party files
a motion to compel arbitration.
In Summer Rain v. Donning Co./Publishers,Inc." the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of whether
the Arbitration Act provides for severance of arbitrable and nonarbitrable
"issues" without regard to the way those issues are grouped into "claims."
Specifically, the court addressed the application of the intertwining doctrine
in a case not involving pendent claims.
In Summer Rain the plaintiffs, a group of authors, alleged primarily
that the defendant, Donning Company, their publisher, had improperly
transferred the publishing rights to their books. The authors all had
contracts with Donning. These contracts gave Donning exclusive rights to
publish their books and contained anti-assignment clauses. Donning sold
the rights to the authors' books and inventories of the authors' books to
the defendant Schiffer Publishing Limited. The authors alleged that this
transfer constituted fraud and breach of contract.
Each of the authors' contracts provided for arbitration of all disputes
not involving failure to pay royalties. The authors claimed that the fraud
and breach of contract resulted in a loss of royalties, and that these
nonarbitrable issues involving royalties were so intertwined with the arbitrable issues of fraud and breach of contract that the district court should
decide all issues. Relying on the intertwining doctrine, the district court
concluded that the issues involving royalties were not severable from the
other arbitrable issues. The court denied arbitration of all issues and set
the case for trial.
On interlocutory appeal the Fourth Circuit rejected the district court's
reliance on the intertwining doctrine. The Fourth Circuit relied on the
Supreme Court's decision in Byrd.1 6 In Byrd a party to a contract dispute
sought severance of the arbitrable state claims from the nonarbitrable
federal claims. The lower courts had applied the intertwining doctrine and
denied arbitration of all claims. The Supreme Court, after examining the
legislative history of the Arbitration Act, determined that the purpose'of
the Act was to promote arbitration wherever the parties to a suit had a
signed agreement to arbitrate some or all issues. The Court therefore
concluded that the intertwining doctrine could not preclude arbitration of
arbitrable pendent state claims even if the result was inefficient bifurcated
proceedings.
The holding in Byrd addressed only the narrow issue of severance of
arbitrable pendent claims. The Supreme Court did not explicitly reject the
intertwining doctrine in all situations. Moreover, the Court spoke in terms
of "claims," rather than "issues." Thus, Byrd did not clearly resolve

15. 964 F.2d 1455 (4th Cir. 1992).
16. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
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whether courts could sever nonarbitrable issues from arbitrable issues when
those issues are grouped into a single claim.
In Summer Rain, the Fourth Circuit addressed this question. The court
noted that the Arbitration Act speaks in terms of issues. The court then
noted that the Supreme Court had relied on the Arbitration Act in
determining that pendent claims were severable. The court concluded that,
because the Supreme Court had relied on the Act, the Supreme Court
must have equated issues with claims. Extrapolating from the Supreme
Court's narrow holding in Byrd, the Fourth Circuit inferred that the Court
must have intended to require severance of all arbitrable issues.
The Fourth Circuit also undertook its own analysis of the Arbitration
Act. The court reasoned that because the Act speaks only of issues, courts
should determine arbitrability on an issue by issue basis without regard to
the ways the issues are grouped into claims. The court then cited the
Supreme Court's decision in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of
Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University,17 in which the Supreme
Court emphasized that courts should resolve ambiguities as to the scope
of an arbitration clause in favor of arbitration. The Fourth Circuit
interpreted this case to require courts to apply the Arbitration Act broadly,
providing a strong presumption in favor of arbitration of any arbitrable
issues. Employing both its interpretation of Byrd and its analysis of the
Arbitration Act, the Fourth Circuit determined that the Arbitration Act
precludes use of the intertwining doctrine to deny arbitration of arbitrable
issues even when those issues are grouped together with other nonarbitrable
issues in a single claim.
Applying this reasoning to the case sub judice, the Fourth Circuit
found that the key issues in the case, the issues of fraud and breach of
contract, were subject to arbitration under the authors' contracts.18 The
court held that these issues should be submitted to arbitration. The court
recognized that some issues involving royalties were not subject to arbitration and withheld these issues from arbitration. Because the determination of the royalty issues likely would turn on the resolution of the
other arbitrable issues, the court stayed litigation until arbitration of the
fraud and breach of contract issues. Finally, the Fourth Circuit assigned
to the district court the power to frame the precise issues for the arbitrators
to resolve.
In Summer Rain the Fourth Circuit aligned itself with prior decisions
of the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits rejecting the intertwining
doctrine.19 These circuits had held that the Arbitration Act requires courts

17. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
18. Summer Rain v. Donning Co./Publishers, Inc., 964 F.2d 1455, 1461 (4th Cir. 1992).
The court withheld one count in the plaintiffs' complaint from arbitration, involving a deduction

of royalties, and set that count for trial. Id.
19. See Byrd, 470 U.S. at 217 (noting circits rejecting intertwining doctrine). The Fifth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits had relied on the intertwining doctrine prior to Byrd. Id. at 216.
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to compel arbitration of arbitrable claims whenever one party so requests. 20
The Fourth Circuit held that the Act requires arbitration not only of
separate arbitrable claims, but also of all arbitrable issues without regard
to how they are grouped into claims.
The Fourth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Byrd in
reaching this conclusion. In Byrd the Supreme Court held that the Arbitration Act requires severance of arbitrable pendent claims. The Fourth
Circuit interpreted that decision to equate claims with issues. From that
inference the Fourth Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court meant to
preclude use of the intertwining doctrine to deny arbitration of any
arbitrable issue.
The Fourth Circuit may have interpreted the Supreme Court's decision
in Byrd too expansively. Because the holding in Byrd involved only the
relatively narrow question of pendent claims, the Supreme Court discussed
the more general questions about the intertwining doctrine in very loose
terms. Initially the Byrd Court referred to section 4 of the Arbitration
Act, which speaks in terms of "issues. "21 However, in its discussion of
the various circuits' holdings regarding the intertwining doctrine, the Court
spoke in terms of "claims." 22 Finally, in its holding, the Court stated that
it agreed with the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits that the Act requires
severance of pendent claims. 23 The Court never clearly stated whether it
intended "claims" or "pendent claims" to correlate with "issues" in the
statute. Nor did the Court state whether it intended to reject the intertwining doctrine in situations not involving pendent claims.
The Fourth Circuit has some authority and support for rejecting the
intertwining doctrine outright and interpreting the Arbitration Act to
require severance of all arbitrable issues. The Act speaks in terms of
issues, and the Supreme Court's holding in Volt 24 indicates that courts
should resolve ambiguities in favor of arbitration. In addition, the holding
in Byrd does demonstrate a willingness to sever arbitrable matters. However, Byrd neither declared the intertwining doctrine dead, nor required
severance of all artitrable matters in all cases. Therefore, the Fourth
Circuit may have read Byrd too broadly.

20.
21.
22.
23.

See id. at 217 (noting circuits rejecting intertwining doctrine).
Id. at 215.
Id. at 216-17.
Id. at 217. Significantly, all the circuit court cases the Supreme Court cited involved

questions of severance of pendent state claims. See Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 733 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1984) (rejecting intertwining doctrine in regard to pendent
claims); Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., 717 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1983) (same); Belke v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 693 F.2d 1023 (11th Cir. 1982) (upholding intertwining
doctrine in regard to pendent claims); Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc., 661 F.2d 638 (7th
Cir. 1981) (rejecting intertwining doctrine in regard to pendent claims); Miley v. Oppenheimer &
Co., 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981) (upholding intertwining doctrine in regard to pendent claims).
24. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489

U.S. 468 (1989).

